Report pages 31–36: 48 claims on pp. 31–36 (fact 6, statement 11, evidence 1, conclusion 26, conjecture 3, definition 1).
BTAUs must establish avenues to receive reports of concerning behavior in the community, including internal and external agency referrals and bystander reporting from the public.
Without clear channels for reporting, BTAUs may miss opportunities to identify and intervene with individuals of concern.
Units must further have the capability to triage all reports for imminent threats to life or safety and respond accordingly.
BTAUs may then triage reports for relevancy to the units’ objectives and share information with parties external to the units as necessary.
The Secret Service receives information relevant to the agency’s protective mission from a variety of sources, including concerned bystanders, law enforcement agencies, and other organizations. Regardless of the source, all information with a Protective Intelligence nexus is collected and processed through a centralized operations center within the Secret Service.
BTAUs will similarly receive reports of concerning behavior from within their own agency, members of the community, and outside law enforcement agencies and partner organizations, which should be routed to a centralized point for processing.
In this framework, the term bystander is used to describe an individual who observes threatening or concerning behavior in another person and is able to report that behavior to the appropriate public safety professionals.
Bystander reporting is a cornerstone of targeted violence prevention efforts.
BTAUs may establish a centralized reporting mechanism or utilize an existing reporting program to facilitate bystander reporting.
To improve accessibility, reporting mechanisms should provide a variety of avenues for reporting, including smartphone apps, online web portals, dedicated email addresses, and tiplines.
Programs should offer an anonymous or confidential reporting option, as research has shown that these features increase bystander reporting rates.
Additionally, reporting mechanisms should be monitored 24/7, and all reports should elicit a response.
Reporting systems must also be regularly promoted as a resource available to the public, making clear to bystanders that there is an avenue for them to report when they have concerns for the safety of themselves or others.
If reporting programs are operated by another agency, the BTAU will want to ensure clear lines of communication to ensure timely forwarding of relevant reports.
Some states and fusion centers already have established programs for statewide reporting, which may serve as a resource for BTAUs or as a model for developing new reporting programs.
For example, iWatchTexas is a public portal through which reports enter the Texas Suspicious Activity Reporting Network (TxSARNet) and the School Safety Network.
These statewide reporting networks help provide a holistic view of terrorism, crime, and school safety-related suspicious activity and concerns in the State of Texas.
Other states have bystander reporting systems designed specifically to support school safety, such as Safe2Tell Colorado.
In addition to receiving tips about potential school violence, programs like Safe2Tell also receive tips about other concerning behaviors involving students, such as bullying, drug use, depression, suicide, and self-harm, all of which have been observed as common precursors to school violence.
Improving School Safety Through Bystander Reporting: A Toolkit for Strengthening K-12 Reporting Programs is a joint publication produced by the Secret Service and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA).
The toolkit outlines strategies for establishing and enhancing bystander reporting programs. While this toolkit was written primarily for K-12 school audiences, the principles presented are applicable to broader, community-based reporting mechanisms.
Multiple avenues for reporting (e.g., smartphone apps, online web portals, dedicated email addresses, and tiplines) • Anonymous/confidential reporting • 24/7 monitoring • Timely response
A BTAU should be a known, internal resource for all agency personnel and should provide clear instruction to all agency employees on the types of information that should be referred to the unit for assessment.
For example, if a patrol officer is dispatched to conduct a welfare check and concerning behavior is identified as a result, the officer should know to report the concern to the BTAU for an assessment.
Successful prevention requires all agency personnel to have familiarity with the program.
In-service training opportunities designed to educate all members of the agency on the internal referral process can enhance clarity, improve consistency in implementation, and help build capacity across the agency.
Agencies may also choose to establish certain automated internal referrals that will initiate an assessment.
For example, the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office (PCSO) Threat Management Division has identified criteria for internal law enforcement reports to be automatically routed for review by PCSO analysts for possible threat management follow-up. These criteria include: • evidence of targeted/planned violence toward people or property; • direct or indirect threats of violence; • physical or verbal intimidation (e.g., bullying); • contextually inappropriate comments about harming others; • stalking; • arson; • animal cruelty; • fixation on mass murder, weapons, or violence; • fixation on hate groups, terrorist activity, or extremist material; • suicidal statements with an articulated plan and threats to others; • statements regarding revenge for perceived injury or grievance; • statements regarding a quest for justice; • statements regarding a desire for notoriety; and • statements regarding a desire to solve an unsolvable problem.
Similarly, a BTAU should be a known resource for partner agencies and organizations in the local community.
BTAUs will have to receive and respond to reports of concerning behavior submitted directly from other law enforcement agencies, workplaces, houses of worship, and schools.
By conducting proactive outreach across the community (see STEP 6: Promote Continuous
Why inferred The sentence crosses a page break: this quote is the page 34 part and the sentence continues on page 35 (claim p035-01). Full sentence (pages 34–35): “By conducting proactive outreach across the community (see STEP 6: Promote Continuous Improvement and a Culture of Prevention), BTAUs can educate outside organizations about the BTAU; its ability to receive, assess, and manage reports of concerning behavior; and how to report concerning behavior or the potential for violence.”
Improvement and a Culture of Prevention), BTAUs can educate outside organizations about the BTAU; its ability to receive, assess, and manage reports of concerning behavior; and how to report concerning behavior or the potential for violence.
Why inferred The sentence crosses a page break: this quote is the page 35 part and the sentence begins on page 34 (claim p034-09). Full sentence (pages 34–35): “By conducting proactive outreach across the community (see STEP 6: Promote Continuous Improvement and a Culture of Prevention), BTAUs can educate outside organizations about the BTAU; its ability to receive, assess, and manage reports of concerning behavior; and how to report concerning behavior or the potential for violence.”
When reports of concerning behavior are received, the BTAU must be prepared to triage the information quickly and accurately with an initial focus on identifying and responding to imminent threats to life.
In emergency situations where an imminent threat to life exists, mitigation of the threat takes precedence over the initiation of a behavioral threat assessment.
For example, if coworkers report that an employee showed up armed to a meeting at which the employee expected to be terminated, then an immediate law enforcement response should be prioritized over a behavioral threat assessment. In such a scenario, the focus is on mitigating the physical threat and protecting the safety and wellbeing of everyone present.
A behavioral threat assessment should take place only after the imminent risk is alleviated.
Therefore, BTAUs should have established protocols for responding to reports indicating an imminent threat to life and should define at what point a behavioral threat assessment is incorporated into the process.
Part of the BTAU’s initial processing of reports involves confirming jurisdiction and sharing information with the appropriate internal and external parties as needed. It is important that any information that may assist in protecting public safety is not unnecessarily siloed within the BTAU or the agency.
The BTAU should ensure that other components within its agency (e.g., criminal investigative units) are aware of reports relating to their respective missions.
Likewise, the BTAU should ensure that reports and information it receives that relate to other geographic jurisdictions are shared with those jurisdictions’ public safety personnel. For example, if a BTAU receives information about an individual of concern in a neighboring state, that information must be shared expeditiously with law enforcement agencies in that jurisdiction.
Sharing information with relevant parties can help the BTAU build and strengthen relationships both within its agency and with public safety partners in its community. This can foster an environment of trusted, proactive communication that may benefit the BTAU in its operations, including when seeking information for behavioral threat assessments or assistance in managing individuals of concern, and when responding to imminent threats of harm as described above.
After triaging reports for imminent threats to life and confirming BTAU jurisdiction, the BTAU must evaluate whether the reports and information received are relevant to the unit’s mission and if the behavior described warrants an assessment.
At times, it may be determined that a report is unfounded and an assessment is not warranted.
Foregoing an assessment should be reserved for scenarios when doing so is clearly articulable and defensible.
Even for reports determined to be unfounded, the information should still be documented as future developments or reports may cause the BTAU to revise its assessment.
Unfounded reports may also be relevant to other internal and external partners (e.g., fusion centers or federal law enforcement agencies), and the BTAU should have procedures in place for sharing this information as appropriate.
Examples of unfounded reports that may require no further action from the BTAU include nuisance/prank reports and reports lacking any investigative avenues for gathering additional information, including unidentifiable anonymous threats.
If a report is deemed actionable, the BTAU will initiate an assessment following the procedures described in STEP 4.
Find the Perfect Training Class For You
